Do these kinds of calculus and does this kind of social restraint actually involve any direct moral reasoning? Or is it just a separate practical question that exists apart from the direct establishment of moral ideals? It depends who you ask. Some people would say that there are no “real” moral dimensions, no further moral questions really being considered (no deep questions of what we should do or should be or teleological ideals). All moral questions are conventional and practical. If you can get away with it, and if people agree generally that it’s fine so it’s not a behavior that will result in negative social consequences, then it is fine.

According to this view, there isn’t another sense of something being right or wrong except insofar as it seems good enough to you or good enough to your social group. Having said that, those theories tend to be extremely pragmatic and driven by personal taste and judgement, so that there really aren’t many restraints on what is possible, and moral criticism of other differing standards becomes very hard to maintain, without invoking some transcendent order about the question of what is “good for” people, in which case you’re bacially slid back into some sort of natural law and teleology.

There’s certainly no reason why you couldn’t develop a personal or social moral code that is very “enlightened” and humanistic and altruistic, if that’s your prejudice, if that’s what floats your boat. There’s just no special reason why you should, no special reason why you shouldn’t endorse a quite opposite philosophy, if that’s what you want. In such cases, the tastefulness of moralities to our delicate sensibilities is very dependent on the optimistic hope that everyone will just happen to be on the same page and want things the same way despite there being no universal law or structure to life or humanity that compels them to do so. You’re just hoping that we all get lucky and all turn out to be nice, deep down. An assumption our history as humans should immediately disabuse you of.

After all, you can’t really argue that the people who engaged in all the kinds of behaviors that disturb us weren’t pursuing their own good and happiness as they defined it, and that an enormous amount of those behaviors were generally approved and allowed by their societies. If you’re a believer in the “noble savage” doctrine, you probably have more hope in the “everybody is nice and will be nice if you let then” doctrine. It’s a strange theory, because it’s so easily disproved by just the most cursory review of history.

And because it claims that there is no other mechanism that defines moral reality, then all of history is nothing but the forces of individual assessment of good and social permission of behaviors playing out. The theory is descriptive as well as prescriptive. There never has been another moral reality; this was the only game that there ever was. So all moralities are just different expressions of it, however they may dress themselves up or articulate themselves. There are no behaviors that are, by their nature, superior or forbidden. If there were, then we would be living in a different moral universe, one with some sort of natural law or teleology. So any statements we make declaring a behavior approved by another person or society (it’s not clear at what level moral authority to make such judgements rests, does it require only one to make the determination, or four people, or a majority of any size group?; at what level does option become authoritative) to be wrong or unacceptable (or good) are really just statements of personal prejudice, not objective, relatable fact. They have no real claims upon the other party (who is not part of their group), who has a different structure of moral calculus.

So moral statements are primarily statements of feeling and personal and social value (positive and negative feeling), that operate as facts within those contexts but have no special validity outside them. So in a sense we are free to criticize people of other times and places, as if we were stating moral facts, so long as we recognize that they are, in fact, not and would have no relevance inside that other person’s structure.

How the fracturing into smaller and smaller moral universes is to be avoided is unclear, except by voluntary arbitrary consent. There’s no special reason why you should choose to allow your moral identity to be constrained by a group, if it’s going to interfere with your own pursuit of your good according to your framework. You could speculate that you might find it easier to get what you want by forming alliances with others, this is the basis of “mutual selfishness benefit” theories of morality. That we’re all really just being completely selfish and there’s no other way to be, but by being slightly less individualistic and more collective we will each actually have a better chance of getting what we want.

And there are some merits to this argument. Of course, it presents us with a morality in which external, not internal, observation is the supreme value. In such a system, you would benefit most maximally by appearing to be the most righteous while privately being the most selfish. The biggest winners would be those who can aquire the benefits of social approval while living in the most individually unrestrained and selfish manner.

A politician who enjoys the benefits of public honor and respect and has a happy family life, but also enriches themselves by their office and enjoys the company of a maximal amount of extramarital liaisons literally has the best of both worlds and has maximized both their public and private morality. And of course, any means you could find to achieve direct public approval for your own maximal selfishness (which isn’t impossible) is the best of all possible worlds. And positions of power and influence and wealth and honor are likely to grant you that sort of happy situation, or at least make it easier, or make it easier to manage the successful juggling of dual moralities.

And it is the case that this does seem to happen a lot, that this case is perhaps what the world, in fact, is, and any resentment of it and of its great heroes and victors is merely delusion (being fooled into believing our own feelings represent some actual transcendent moral code) or jealousy that we weren’t able to achieve such success ourselves. The general tendency of wealth and power is to use them to disconnect certain pro-self behaviors from their usual social consequences, to open up opportunities for fulfillment that were primarily restrained by the limitations of social conventions and lack of opportunities. This isn’t, per se, bad for us, in fact in a way its more authentic and freeing and closer to the fabric underlying the true moral reality. We’re just seeing it exposed with less restraint and negotiation, exposing the underlying forces for what they are. If we could all do that, we would, the only reason we don’t is because doing so would often be counterproductive. But if we can change the structures, the limitations, the opportunities, so that we can get what we want without much risk of negative consequence, then by the only moral law that really exists its almost I cunbent on us to do so. If I want something, if it seems good to me and would make me happier (however I choose to define that, the definition is not restrained by anything other than my personal preferences and prejudices, not determined by some fixed law or nature), and I can have it without seriously compromising my other desires, then I should have it. All morality is merely a negotiation toward the fulfillment of our needs and desires. The only really objective moral question to ask of any other society (and perhaps person) is, did their system succeed in getting them what they wanted? If yes, then way to go. If not, then you blew it somehow. Not in some transcendent moral sense, just in a practical sense. If we share preferences and prejudices, I may learn something practical from your story about how to get what I want by avoiding your mistakes and imitating your successes.

There are no behaviors that are, by their nature, superior or forbidden. If there were, then we would be living in a different moral universe, one with some sort of natural law or teleology. So any statements we make declaring a behavior approved by another person or society (it’s not clear at what level moral authority to make such judgements rests, does it require only one to make the determination, or four people, or a majority of any size group?; at what level does option become authoritative) to be wrong or unacceptable (or good) are really just statements of personal prejudice, not objective, relatable fact. They have no real claims upon the other party (who is not part of their group), who has a different structure of moral calculus.

So moral statements are primarily statements of feeling and personal and social value (positive and negative feeling), that operate as facts within those contexts but have no special validity outside them. So in a sense we are free to criticize people of other times and places, as if we were stating moral facts, so long as we recognize that they are, in fact, not and would have no relevance inside that other person’s structure.

How the fracturing into smaller and smaller moral universes is to be avoided is unclear, except by voluntary arbitrary consent. There’s no special reason why you should choose to allow your moral identity to be constrained by a group, if it’s going to interfere with your own pursuit of your good according to your framework. You could speculate that you might find it easier to get what you want by forming alliances with others, this is the basis of “mutual selfishness benefit” theories of morality. That we’re all really just being completely selfish and there’s no other way to be, but by being slightly less individualistic and more collective we will each actually have a better chance of getting what we want.

And there are some merits to this argument. Of course, it presents us with a morality in which external, not internal, observation is the supreme value. In such a system, you would benefit most maximally by appearing to be the most righteous while privately being the most selfish. The biggest winners would be those who can aquire the benefits of social approval while living in the most individually unrestrained and selfish manner.

A politician who enjoys the benefits of public honor and respect and has a happy family life, but also enriches themselves by their office and enjoys the company of a maximal amount of extramarital liaisons literally has the best of both worlds and has maximized both their public and private morality. And of course, any means you could find to achieve direct public approval for your own maximal selfishness (which isn’t impossible) is the best of all possible worlds. And positions of power and influence and wealth and honor are likely to grant you that sort of happy situation, or at least make it easier, or make it easier to manage the successful juggling of dual moralities.

And it is the case that this does seem to happen a lot, that this case is perhaps what the world, in fact, is, and any resentment of it and of its great heroes and victors is merely delusion (being fooled into believing our own feelings represent some actual transcendent moral code) or jealousy that we weren’t able to achieve such success ourselves. The general tendency of wealth and power is to use them to disconnect certain pro-self behaviors from their usual social consequences, to open up opportunities for fulfillment that were primarily restrained by the limitations of social conventions and lack of opportunities. This isn’t, per se, bad for us, in fact in a way its more authentic and freeing and closer to the fabric underlying the true moral reality. We’re just seeing it exposed with less restraint and negotiation, exposing the underlying forces for what they are. If we could all do that, we would, the only reason we don’t is because doing so would often be counterproductive. But if we can change the structures, the limitations, the opportunities, so that we can get what we want without much risk of negative consequence, then by the only moral law that really exists its almost I cunbent on us to do so. If I want something, if it seems good to me and would make me happier (however I choose to define that, the definition is not restrained by anything other than my personal preferences and prejudices, not determined by some fixed law or nature), and I can have it without seriously compromising my other desires, then I should have it. All morality is merely a negotiation toward the fulfillment of our needs and desires. The only really objective moral question to ask of any other society (and perhaps person) is, did their system succeed in getting them what they wanted? If yes, then way to go. If not, then you blew it somehow. Not in some transcendent moral sense, just in a practical sense. If we share preferences and prejudices, I may learn something practical from your story about how to get what I want by avoiding your mistakes and imitating your successes.
So, any statements we make declaring a behavior approved by another person or society (it’s not clear at what level moral authority to make such judgements tests, does it require only one to make the determination, or four people, or a majority of any size group; at what level does option become authoritative) to be wrong or unacceptable (or good) are really just statements of personal prejudice, not objective, relatable fact. They have no claims upon the other party, who has a different structure of moral calculus. So moral statements are primarily statements of feeling and personal and social value (positive and negative feeling), that operate as facts within those contexts but have no special validity outside them. So in a sense we are free to criticize people of other times and places, as if we were stating moral facts, so long as we recognize that they are, in fact, not and would have no relevance inside that other person’s structure. How the fracturing into smaller and smaller moral universes is to be avoided is unclear, except by voluntary arbitrary consent. There’s no special reason why you should choose to allow your moral identity to be constrained by a group, if it’s going to interfere with your own pursuit of your good according to your framework. You could speculate that you might find it easier to get what you want by forming alliances with others, this is the basis of “mutual selfishness benefit” theories of morality. That were all really just being completely selfish and there’s no other way to be, but by being slightly less individualistic and more collective we will each actually have a better chance of getting what we want. And there are some merits to this argument. Of course, it presents us with a morality in which external, not internal, observation is the supreme value. In such a system, you would benefit most maximally by appearing to be the most righteous while privately being the most selfish. The biggest winners would be those who can aquire the benefits of social approval while living in the most individually unrestrained and selfish manner. A politician who enjoys the benefits of public honor and respect and has a happy family life, but also enriches themselves by their office and enjoys the company of a maximal amount of extramarital liaisons literally has the best of both worlds and has maximized both their public and private morality. And of course, any means you could find to achieve direct public approval for your own maximal selfishness (which isn’t impossible) is the best of all possible worlds. And positions of power and influence and wealth and honor are likely to grant you that sort of happy situation, or at least make it easier, or make it easier to manage the successful juggling of dual moralities. And it is the case that this does seem to happen a lot, that this case is perhaps what the world, in fact, is, and any resentment of it and of its great heroes and victors is merely delusion (being fooled into believing our own feelings represent some actual transcendent moral code) or jealousy that we weren’t able to achieve such success ourselves. The general tendency of wealth and power is to use them to disconnect certain pro-self behaviors from their usual social consequences, to open up opportunities for fulfillment that were primarily restrained by the limitations of social conventions and lack of opportunities. This isn’t, per se, bad for us, in fact in a way its more authentic and freeing and closer to the fabric underlying the true moral reality. We’re just seeing it exposed with less restraint and negotiation, exposing the underlying forces for what they are. If we could all do that, we would, the only reason we don’t is because doing so would often be counterproductive. But if we can change the structures, the limitations, the opportunities, so that we can get what we want without much risk of negative consequence, then by the only moral law that really exists its almost I cunbent on us to do so. If I want something, if it seems good to me and would make me happier (however I choose to define that, the definition is not restrained by anything other than my personal preferences and prejudices, not determined by some fixed law or nature), and I can have it without seriously compromising my other desires, then I should have it. All morality is merely a negotiation toward the fulfillment of our needs and desires. The only really objective moral question to ask of any other society (and perhaps person) is, did their system succeed in getting them what they wanted? If yes, then way to go. If not, then you blew it somehow. Not in some transcendent moral sense, just in a practical sense. If we share preferences and prejudices, I may learn something practical from your story about how to get what I want by avoiding your mistakes and imitating your successes.

The result of such a moral law isn’t likely to be piousness or righteousness or virtue or any such concept, except by delusion and misunderstanding. The power of such a moral law is minimal obedience. People will obey just insofar as they can be sure they will benefit. And in their private life, anywhere they can, they seek the underlying advantage that is the real goal of such a morality.